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Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic has proven to be a global public health event. In response, states across 
the world have announced unprecedented packages of economic assistance and have locked 
down large parts of society, in attempts to control the impact and spread of the virus. 
Responsibility for lockdown restrictions in the United Kingdom has involved the coordination 
and agreement of the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations. This paper analyses 
the Covid-19 regulations in the UK from a territorial perspective. It is argued that policy 
differences between the four constituent parts of the UK in response to the pandemic have 
brought to the fore a number of important issues associated with devolution and territorial 
governance, in particular in regard to relations between the UK Government and the Devolved 
Administrations.  
Devolution and Divergence 
Since 1998, the UK’s territorial constitution has been transformed by the introduction of 
devolution in Scotland and Wales, and its reintroduction in Northern Ireland. The system of 
devolution across these three parts of the UK is asymmetrical in form, with the powers held by 
the three legislatures varying in the range and depth of powers devolved.1 This model of 
devolution then becomes doubly-asymmetrical when considered against the absence of 
legislative devolution in England.2  
As a result of this asymmetrical system of devolution, there are certain policy competences 
which operate by default on an England-only basis, yet where the authority to legislate on 
England-only matters continues to rest solely with the UK Parliament. In other words, as a 
consequence of devolution, the UK Parliament has assumed a dual-hatted role as the de facto 
legislature for England, on England-only matters, as well as the legislature for the United 
Kingdom, on UK-wide matters.3 The same applies to the UK Government.  
In relation to the  Covid-19 pandemic, we find that a number of the policy areas necessary for 
responding to the pandemic – public health, education and social care – fall under the authority 
of separate administrations for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In relation to 
the lockdown, therefore, the authority of the UK Parliament and executive to make regulations 
on a UK-wide basis is limited, politically, by devolution.4  
                                                          
1 Scotland Act 1998; Northern Ireland Act 1998; Government of Wales Act 2006.  
2 Stephen Tierney, “Giving with one hand: Scottish devolution within a unitary state” (2007) 5:4 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 730. 
3 Charlie Jeffrey, “Dis-United Kingdom” (2012) 19:1 Juncture, 14.  
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Reinforcing this point, the statutory framework for the enforcement of lockdown restrictions 
across the UK is also arranged on a four-nation basis. In all four parts of the UK, an important 
element of this framework comes via the Coronavirus Act 2020 (“the 2020 Act”). The 2020 
Act supplements the existing statutory frameworks in all four parts of the UK by conferring 
powers on all four Governments to impose restrictions on public gatherings and other activities, 
in areas such as public health, justice and education.5 In Scotland, the 2020 Act6 supplements 
the existing statutory framework set out under the Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act 2008, and 
has subsequently been added to by the two Coronavirus (Scotland) Acts, passed by the Scottish 
Parliament.7 Similarly, in England and Wales respectively, the 2020 Act supplements the 
statutory framework provided under Part 2A of the Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 
19848, as amended by the Health Protection Act 2008.9 In Northern Ireland, the effect of the 
2020 Act10 differs slightly by directly amending, as opposed to supplementing, the Public 
Health Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, to include the new Part 1A which details new temporary 
powers for responding to the Covid-19 pandemic in Northern Ireland.11  
Territorial Approaches to Covid-19 Regulations 
Due to the statutory framework underpinning the response to Covid-19 incorporating areas of 
devolved competence, moving into the pandemic it was apparent that facilitating a UK-wide 
response would require the coordination and agreement of the UK Government and the 
Devolved Administrations. This section maps the intergovernmental response in the lead up to 
the instigation of the UK-wide lockdown on 23 March 2020, and in the weeks immediately 
following the implementation of lockdown regulations.  
On 2 March 2020, the UK Prime Minister chaired a meeting of the Civil Contingencies 
Committee (COBRA), tasked with coordinating a UK-wide response to the forecast rise in 
cases of Covid-19 in the UK. The political leaders of the three Devolved Administrations were 
each present at the meeting. The next day, with the agreement of the Devolved Administrations, 
the Cabinet Office published the Coronavirus: action plan, detailing proposals for a UK-wide 
response to the pandemic:  
“Recognising the respective roles and responsibilities of the UK Government and the 
Devolved Administrations, this document sets out what the UK as a whole has already 
done – and plans to do further – to tackle the current coronavirus outbreak…”12 
The decision to coordinate the response to the pandemic on a four-nation basis, as opposed to 
Westminster relying on legislation to assume a more prominent UK-wide role – such as under 
the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (hereafter “CCA”) – reflects both the nature of the pandemic 
and the applicability of the statutory frameworks available. In substantive terms, when 
compared to the Coronavirus Act 2020, the CCA provides for more extensive executive powers 
                                                          
5 For a useful summary, see: Institute for Government, “The Coronavirus Act 2020” (26 March 2020), 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/coronavirus-act [Accessed 23 August 2020]. 
6 Coronavirus Act 2020, Sch.19. 
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to respond to a national crisis, but also includes additional parliamentary and judicial oversight 
of such executive action, including a 30-day sunset clause for emergency regulations passed 
under the Act.13 While the powers under the CCA are more wide reaching, their activation 
includes a high threshold test – “state of emergency”14 – as well as including an explicit judicial 
review function.15  
On a practical point, while offering the possibility of a more centralised response, the CCA 
also does not work to exclude the Devolved Administrations from the decision making process. 
Under section 29 of the CCA, the UK Government is still required to “consult” the relevant 
Devolved Administrations on emergency regulations that may affect Scotland, Wales or 
Northern Ireland. While this duty can be overridden – if the situation is deemed “urgent” – the 
test for establishing urgency again poses a high statutory threshold, and is subject to scrutiny 
by Parliament and the judiciary. Due to the unprecedented nature of the pandemic, and the 
uncertain timeframe required for a response, the choice to rely on an alternative statutory 
framework to the CCA, and not to impose a state of emergency, seems to have offered a more 
suitable solution for responding to Covid-19.  
In the weeks following the publication of the Coronavirus: action plan, the response to the 
pandemic continued on a coordinated four-nation basis, with the Devolved Administrations 
continuing to be involved in meetings of COBRA, as well as sending representatives to the 
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). The culture of intergovernmental 
cooperation and agreement was further articulated in the passage of the Coronavirus Act 2020. 
The explanatory notes to the Act provide detail of the UK Government’s recognition of 
devolved policy areas in the response to Covid-19, as well as its role on England-only matters:  
“These provisions also take due account of the UK’s devolution settlement in a way 
that enables swift action to be taken when and where it is needed. UK Government 
Ministers control the use of provisions on matters that are reserved or England only. 
This is intended to be a streamlined system that is nonetheless consonant with the role 
of the Devolved Administrations.”16 
The explanatory notes also detailed the UK Government’s view that it “would be appropriate” 
to seek the legislative consent of the Devolved Administrations – through the Sewel 
Convention – on the provisions in the Bill relating to areas of devolved competence.17 On 24 
March, the Welsh Parliament, along with the legislatures in Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
gave legislative consent to the Coronavirus Bill. In its legislative consent memorandum to the 
Senedd, the Welsh Government detailed its support for the “cohesive UK approach” fostered 
by the Bill in tacking the pandemic.18  
Examination of the statutory instruments containing the main executive response to the 
pandemic also points to coordination between the four governments. For example, in England 
and Wales respectively, the regulations detailing the initial lockdown restrictions were identical 
on many points, with the main provision in both countries outlining: “during the emergency 
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period, no person may leave the place where they are living without reasonable excuse.”19 
Furthermore, while minor territorial differences did exist, the main executive message at the 
beginning of the lockdown was consistent across all four parts of the UK: “stay at home, save 
lives, protect the NHS”.  
While scholars of other decentralised constitutional systems may not be surprised by the level 
of cooperation and coordination between the UK Government and the Devolved 
Administrations on the road into the lockdown, the showing of intergovernmental cooperation 
during this period marked a stark contrast to the situation in the months and years preceding 
the pandemic.  
Over much of the past two decades of devolution, the system of intergovernmental relations 
(IGR) between the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations has been subject to 
sustained political and academic scrutiny. Academic debates have focused on the relatively 
underdeveloped system of IGR or ‘shared rule’ to accompany the substantive provisions for 
‘self-rule’ provided for under the devolution statutes. Indeed, unlike the robust devolved 
administrations that have emerged in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, the structure of UK IGR 
has historically developed along informal channels, beset by ad hoc meetings and an 
entrenched culture of hierarchy from the UK Government.20 The lack of formality in the IGR 
arrangements, and the lack of equal status for the Devolved Administrations, has been 
highlighted particularly following the Brexit referendum in June 2016.  
The impact of the soured relations between the two levels of government after June 2016 is 
effectively captured in Richard Rawlings’ description of the new era of “uncooperative 
devolution” that emerged after the 2016 referendum.21 Indeed, two months prior to legislative 
consent being passed for the Coronavirus Bill, all three devolved legislatures withheld 
legislative consent on the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill.22 Despite this 
unprecedented showing of opposition by the Devolved Administrations, the UK Government 
moved to push ahead with the Bill, which received royal assent two weeks later. Thus, while 
sobering at a time of national crisis, the promise of a shift in the culture of IGR in response to 
Covid-19 offered promise of a turning point in the dynamics of shared rule – or at the very least 
a reversal of the period of uncooperative devolution.  
Territorial Divergence  
In all four parts of the UK, the statutory framework for the lockdown required that a review of 
the regulations take place every 21 days.23 The first review of the four sets of regulations took 
                                                          
19 The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, reg.6; The Health Protection 
(Coronavirus Restrictions) (Wales) Regulations 2020, reg.8; For commentary, see: Jeff King, “The Lockdown is 
Lawful” (1 April 2020), UK Constitutional Law Association blog, 
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relations and party politics” (2014) 12:4/5 Comparative European Politics 488. 
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(Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, reg.3(2); The Health Protection (Coronavirus) 
(Restrictions) (Scotland) Regulations 2020, reg.2(2); The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) 
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place in mid-April, and saw the four administrations continue a cohesive approach to 
maintaining the lockdown, in light of the continuing rise in cases of Covid-19 across the UK.24 
Over the next three-week period moving to the second review stage in early-May, a slowing in 
the number of cases of Covid-19 began to alter the debate and raise speculation on plans for a 
future easing of lockdown restrictions. On 24 April, in preparation for a future easing of 
restrictions, the Welsh Government published its white paper detailing its targets and 
preferences for moving out of the lockdown:   
“The whole of the UK entered ‘lockdown’ in the same ways and at the same time, and 
our preference as a government would be that all four nations retain a common 
approach to lifting the restrictions. However, we have been consistent in making clear 
that we will take the right decisions in the interests of the people of Wales.”25 
The message conveyed by the Welsh Government in this statement matched similar 
announcements made by the political leaders of Scotland and Northern Ireland; a desire to 
maintain a coherent four-nation approach to the lockdown, but not ruling out the possibility of 
policy divergence should epidemiological data indicate it to be necessary. At this point, the 
reality of devolution had begun to raise the possibility of different approaches between the four 
parts of the UK in exiting the lockdown.  
On 7 May 2020, following the second review of the lockdown regulations, the political leaders 
of Scotland and Northern Ireland both announced additional three-week extensions to the 
lockdown. On 8 May, the First Minister of Wales announced that the lockdown would also be 
extended in Wales, with only modest easing of some restrictions to allow for the reopening of 
garden centres, and permitting unlimited exercise that did not involve travelling a significant 
distance from a home address.26 As was the case on the road into lockdown, while some minor 
differences existed in the regulations across the three devolved parts of the UK, the overarching 
message remained consistent in reiterating the extension of the lockdown, and the executive 
guidance to “stay at home”.   
On 10 May, the Prime Minister announced the outcome of the review of lockdown restrictions 
in England. In contrast to the devolved parts of the UK, it was announced that restrictions in 
England would be partially relaxed to allow citizens living in England to leave their home area 
and travel an unlimited distance (in England) to undertake exercise. Moreover, the government 
guidance accompanying the change in lockdown restrictions in England was amended from 
“stay at home” to “stay alert”, and some workers unable to work from home were encouraged 
to return to work from 13 May.27   
As of 11 May, therefore, a clear divergence had emerged in the territorial response to Covid-
19 between England and the devolved parts of the UK. On this point, it is important to note 
that on a number of the key aspects of territorial difference, the divergence in restrictions was 
not the result of a substantive alteration of the legal regulations governing the lockdown, but 
of a change in government guidelines on the restrictions. For example, in England, the decision 
to allow individuals to travel an unlimited distance for exercise did not require an amendment 
                                                          
24 BBC, 16 April 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-52313715 [Accessed 20 May 2020]. 
25 Welsh Government, Leading Wales out of the coronavirus pandemic: a framework for recovery (24 April 
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to the statutory instrument, as the regulations – as originally enacted – included provision for 
exercise during the lockdown, with no reference included to distance limits.28  
Investigating the governmental responses leading to the divergence on 11 May, we find that an 
aspect of the initial four-nation approach that appears to have reduced as the pandemic 
developed relates to communication between the four governments, and in particular between 
the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations. In the week following the beginning 
of substantial policy divergence from 11 May, the First Minister of Wales indicated that 
communication with the UK Government since the first review of lockdown restrictions had 
come in “fits and starts”. It was reported that there had been a two-week gap in 
intergovernmental communication over this period, followed by a series of ad hoc meetings in 
the days before the public announcements in early May.29 Similarly, the Scottish First Minister 
claimed that the Scottish Government had only learned of the UK Government’s change of 
messaging from “stay at home” to “stay alert” via an article in the Sunday Telegraph, and had 
received no prior briefing on the changes in England.30  
Two important constitutional issues arise here.  The first concerns whether the four 
governments had any duty to communicate the outcome of their reviews of lockdown 
restrictions to each other prior to announcing the results to the public. The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), which sets out the system of IGR between the UK Government and the 
Devolved Administrations, states in paragraph 4 that: 
“All four administrations are committed to the principle of good communication with 
each other, and especially where one administration’s work may have some bearing 
upon the responsibilities of another administration.”31 
Nevertheless, the constitutional status of the MoU is explicit as a “statement of political intent” 
that “does not create legal obligations between the parties”.32 Thus, while the parties may be 
committed to good communication, there exists very little in the way of constitutional 
architecture or sanction to fall back on should such commitments diminish, or disappear. 
Central to this argument is a wider point on the structure and constitutional culture 
underpinning UK IGR. The informal mechanics of IGR are a remnant of the initial devolution 
settlement in 1998. As already noted, this created a heavily asymmetrical model of devolution, 
against which multilateral IGR was often not required or feasible. Moreover, the fact that the 
Labour Party initially formed the governments in Westminster, Wales and Scotland meant that 
policy difference and dispute resolution was often handled within party channels, and did not 
always require a formal architecture for IGR. Despite the devolution settlement having evolved 
significantly since 1998 – becoming more symmetrical (outside of England); seeing an increase 
in the powers of the Devolved Administrations on financial matters; as well as the emergence 
party political incongruity between the four Governments – the informal architecture of IGR, 
at least on a multilateral basis, has remained relatively unchanged.33 Mixed with the culture of 
                                                          
28 The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, reg.6(2)(b).  
29 BBC, 15 May 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-52677444 [Accessed 16 May 2020]. 
30 The Guardian, 10 May 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/10/nicola-sturgeon-leads-
criticism-of-uks-new-stay-alert-coronavirus-lockdown-advice [Accessed 23 August 2020].  
31 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements, (HMSO: October 2013), para.4.  
32 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements, para.2. 
33 Nicola McEwen, “Still better together? Purpose and power in intergovernmental councils in the UK” (2017) 
27:5 Regional and Federal Studies 667.  
hierarchy of the UK Government – as well as the complexity of its dual-hatted role on England-
only matters – and the different territorialised perspectives of power and authority advanced 
by the Devolved Administrations, the absence of a formal architecture for IGR provides only 
limited opportunity for commitments to be meaningfully practised or sustained.   
The second point relates to the practical outcomes of territorial difference between the four 
parts of the UK. In the weeks following the initial divergence in lockdown restrictions after 11 
May, reports circulated in Wales and England of public confusion concerning which 
regulations applied to border communities, or cross-border commuters.34 In July 2020, the 
Scottish Government noted also that the faster pace for the relaxing of restrictions in other parts 
of the UK could lead to changes to the Scottish regulations, whereby citizens from other parts 
of the UK might be required to quarantine when entering Scotland.35 In both cases, the visibility 
of territorial divergence in the lockdown regulations offered notable examples of devolution in 
action, as well as also highlighting the issues associated with the dual-hatted role of the UK 
Government. Indeed, since early May, the UK Government’s reduced communication with the 
Devolved Administrations – in particular regarding England-only regulations – has exposed 
some of the problems in the informal and unequal mechanisms for intergovernmental 
cooperation. The visibility of the regulations has also highlighting public confusion on the dual-
hatted role of the UK Government acting at two territorial levels.  
Leaving aside the possibility, if not the probability, that Covid-19 regulations will continue to 
be necessary for a number of months, the weaknesses of the mechanisms for intergovernmental 
cooperation between the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations – and for 
effectively communicating territorial difference to the public – look set to continue to strain 
UK territorial politics. Whether or not a more coordinated system of intergovernmental 
cooperation can emerge in future, therefore, promises to exert a lasting effect on the UK 
response to Covid-19, but also over the wider dynamics and stability of the territorial 
constitution.  
Towards a ‘New Normal’ in the Territorial Constitution? 
The lockdown regulations are by no means the first example of policy differentiation across 
the UK. Nevertheless, the significance and visibility of the regulations – and the territorial 
differentiation between the four parts of the UK – has served as a high-profile example of 
devolution in action. As mentioned, a notable aspect of this episode has been to highlight the 
impact of devolution on traditional understandings of territorial governance between the four 
component parts of the UK.  
In England, as well as the rest of the UK, the divergence in regulations has raised questions of 
the UK Government concerning the need for clarity in the communication of its dual-hatted 
role. In future, a lot may turn on Westminster’s ability to facilitate UK-wide coordination and 
agreement, while also representing the interests of England and respecting the political limits 
imposed by devolution.    
                                                          
34 LSE Blog, “Different lockdown rules in the four nations are confusing the public” (22 May 2020), 
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In addition to England and Westminster, the Covid-19 pandemic has also raised the profile of 
devolution across the rest of the UK. In May 2020, the First Minister of Wales acknowledged: 
“It is certainly true that people outside Wales and in London appear to have woken up from a 
20-year sleep on the devolution agenda”.36 Indeed, in Wales, the difference in lockdown 
restrictions has afforded clear examples of the Welsh Government’s willingness to utilise its 
constitutional position in response to the pandemic, and in asserting the authority of Welsh 
Law when doing so.37 While recognising the unprecedented context from which these 
statements have emerged, it is nevertheless apparent that the events of the lockdown have added 
confidence to the devolution process in Wales and, in the future, may reopen debates on the 
model of devolution operating in Wales.   
While it is unlikely that the events associated with the Covid-19 pandemic will in themselves 
lead to a radical amending of the territorial constitution, the territorial response to the pandemic 
has opened a number of questions on the need for better recognition of devolution, as well as 
the need for a more coordinated framework for shared rule between the four parts of the UK.  
Concluding Remarks 
The territorial response to the Covid-19 pandemic has focused attention on a key objective of 
devolution: the ability to tailor policy in relation to territorial need. In future, a lot may hinge 
on the ability of the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations to better communicate 
territorial policy difference, both in the enactment of regulations, as well as in providing the 
clarity needed to enable political accountability. Finding a ‘new normal’ to facilitate a more 
formalised and coordinated system of intergovernmental cooperation between the four 
governments remains one of the biggest challenges facing the UK devolution settlement.  
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